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Williams v. State Dep’t of Corr., 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 75 (Oct. 5, 2017)1 
 
CRIMINAL APPEAL: COMPUTATION OF TIME SERVED   
 
Summary 
 
The Nevada Supreme Court considered whether an offender must serve the minimum term 
of his or her sentence before any credits earned pursuant to the Credits statute apply to eligibility 
for parole. The Court disagreed with this argument, and held that credits earned can factor-in for 
parole eligibility if the offender was sentenced under a state that requires a minimum term, but 
does not explicitly mention parole eligibility.  
 
Background 
 
 In 2010, Jessica Williams was driving under the influence and struck and killed six 
teenagers. She was convicted pursuant to the DUI statute and sentenced to six consecutive terms, 
with a minimum term of thirty-six months and a maximum term of ninety-six months for each 
count. 
  
Six years later, Williams filed a writ of habeas corpus petition arguing that her credits 
earned should apply to her eligibility for parole, pursuant to the Credits statute. The district court 
denied the petition, finding that the Nevada Legislature intended for the offender to serve the 
minimum term before being eligible for parole. This appeal followed.  
 
Discussion 
 
Williams was not sentenced pursuant to a statute that specified a minimum sentence that must be 
served before she becomes eligible for parole  
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court reviewed de novo whether the Legislature intended for 
prisoners to serve the minimum term of their sentence before becoming eligible for parole. The 
Court looked at the plain meaning of NRS 209.4465(7), which states that credits earned “(a) must 
be deducted from a prisoner’s maximum term…and (b) apply to eligibility for parole unless the 
offender was sentenced pursuant to a statute which specifies a minimum sentence that must be 
served before a person becomes eligible for parole”.2 
 
Williams was sentenced pursuant to former NRS 484.3795(1) (currently codified as 
484C.430(1)), which stated that a person in violation of the statute would be punished by a 
“minimum term of not less than 2 years and a maximum term of not more than 20 years”.3 Since 
the statute is silent regarding parole eligibility, the Court concluded that the plain language of the 
statute does not specify a term the prisoner must serve before becoming eligible for parole. 
																																																						
1  By Xheni Ristani.  
2  NEV. REV. STAT. § 209.4465(7) (2017). 
3  NEV. REV. STAT. § 484.3795(1) (1999).  
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Therefore, Williams was not limited by NRS 209.4465(7)(b) and she was allowed a deduction of 
credits from her minimum sentence. 
 
The State argued that statutes that specify a set minimum term, like NRS 484.3797(1), 
inherently require the offender to serve the minimum term before being eligible for parole. The 
Court found two problems with the State’s interpretation.  
 
First, the Court noted that the plain language in NRS 484.3797(1) contrasts with the 
language used in other sentencing statutes, which “delineate a [maximum sentence], with 
eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of [x] years has been served”.4 These are different 
from statutes like the DUI statute here, which make no reference to parole eligibility.5 Based on 
these differences, the Court concluded that the Legislature did not intend that offenders serve a 
specific term before becoming parole-eligible if the sentencing statute does not include express 
language to that effect.  
 
Second, the State’s interpretation would render the general rule in the Credits statute, that 
credits apply to parole eligibility, meaningless, and as such, must be avoided.6 There are three 
types of sentences in Nevada: minimum-maximum, parole-eligibility, and determinate sentences. 
NRS 209.4465(7)(b) does not apply to determinate sentences, because such sentences only have a 
maximum term and NRS 209.4465(7)(a) already applies to maximum terms. Nor does NRS 
209.4465(7)(b) apply to parole-eligibility sentences, since these types of sentences expressly state 
the minimum term that must be served by offenders and are excluded by the language in the statute. 
The State’s interpretation would have the same effect on the minimum-maximum sentences, 
resulting in meaningless statutory language. Accordingly, the Court found that the sentencing 
statute in this case did not require a minimum term to be served before the offender could be 
eligible for parole and NRS 209.4465(7)(b) allows a deduction of credits from Williams’ minimum 
sentence.  
 
NRS 213.120(2) does not control over NRS 209.4465(7)(b) 
 
As a secondary argument, the State focuses on NRS 213.120(2), which, at the time of 
Williams’ offense, stated that “[a]ny credits earned to reduce [a prisoner’s] sentence pursuant to 
chapter 209 of NRS while the prisoner serves the minimum term of imprisonment may reduce only 
the maximum term of imprisonment imposed and must not reduce the minimum term of 
imprisonment”.7 Since this provision conflicts with NRS 209.4465(7)(b), the Court relied on two 
rules of statutory construction to resolve the conflict: the general/specific canon and the implied 
repeal canon.  
 
																																																						
4  See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030(4)(b)(2)–(3) (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.366(2)(a)(2) (2015); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 200.366(2)(b) (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 453.334(1)–(2) (1999).  
5  See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.380(2) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.481 (2017); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 
193.130(2)(b)–(e) (1999).		
6  Hobbs v. State, 127 Nev. 234, 237, 251 P.3d 177, 179 (2011).	
7  NEV. REV. STAT. § 235.120 (1995). 
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The general/specific canon dictates that the more specific statute takes precedence8 and is 
construed as an exception to the general statute.9 The Court concluded that NRS 213.120(2) is the 
more general statute and NRS 209.4465(7)(b) is the more specific statute, and therefore, the latter 
is an exception to the former. The implied repeal canon reaches the same result. The canon solves 
the conflict by providing that the more recent statute is controlling.10 Accordingly, NRS 
209.4465(7)(b) is more recent, and controls in this case. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Based on the Court’s interpretation, NRS 209.4465(7)(b) allows credits earned to be 
applied to Williams’ minimum sentence, because the sentencing statute in this case was silent on 
parole eligibility. The Court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case.   
 
 
																																																						
8  Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 687, 120 P.3d 1164, 1167 (2005). 
9  See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 183 (2012).		
10  Laird v. State of Nev. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 98 Nev. 42, 45, 635 P.2d 1171, 1173 (1982).  
